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scientific spirit which is prepared to reject any preconceived 
ideas for the sake of a more profound understanding of the world 
and greater consonance with observation. But they do not over- 
emphasize the Schadenfreude inherent in discarding past errors-- 
in fact, as one of them says, revolution in thought may be the 
same thing as evolution. It is traumatic only to the dogmatist, 
although few of us are entirely free from conditioning to some 
routines of thought. 
One cannot help but wonder how many of the beliefs which we 
now consider to be as self-evident as the parallel postulate in 
Euclid was once thought to be, will ultimately have to be discard- 
ed. This set of essays deals largely with our knowledge of the 
physical world. A parallel volume on the behavioural sciences, 
psychology, economics, sociology and politics would be equally 
fascinating, albeit more controversial. But perhaps it is too 
soon to expect such a thing. In the physical sciences advances 
are not usually so dangerous as to lead their discoverers to 
the stake. In the social sciences they may still entail ostra- 
cism or exile, or, worse still, neglect. 
PHYSICS AT SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURY LEIDEN. Edward 
G. Ruestow. The Hague (Martinus Nijhoff.) 1973. 
Gld. 24.50 
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Reviewed by Lewis Pyenson, Institut d'histoire 
et de sociopolitique des sciences, Universit6 de Montrkl 
Between its founding in the late 16th century and the end of 
the 18th century, the University of Leiden occupied a central and 
unique role in intellectual life and especially in the sciences. 
Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, the academies in London, 
Paris, Geneva, and St. Petersburg, among others, were the great 
seats and patrons of the sciences. The universities, in contrast, 
were in a nearly universal state of degeneration and decay. Often 
having been founded as academies, they became the focus of cruel 
political crosswinds upon being granted the right to confer de- 
grees . Many that were not suppressed were allowed to expire; still 
others survived through neglect. 
Leiden proved an exception to this rule. It remained sur- 
prisingly open to new scientific currents. By 1700, as a result 
of institutionalizing innovations for a wide range of fields, 
it was incontestably the first university of Europe. It had been 
the first public institution in Europe to establish a teaching 
observatory (1633) and to offer a chemistry laboratory (1669); 
the first (together with Jena) to teach William Harvey’s doctrine 
concerning the circulation of the blood; the first to implement 
with lasting effect Padua’s experiment in clinical instruction for 
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medicine. In 1700, Leiden had the world’s largest botanical 
collection. A medical degree from Leiden was valued perhaps above 
all others in Europe. When the names Boerhaave, Musschenbroek and 
‘s Gravesande are listed among the university’s graduates and 
professors in this period, the focus of Ruestow’s study becomes 
obvious. 
Or does it? That is, can one talk about a discipline “phy- 
sics” that leaves a clearly identifiable and reasonably self- 
contained trace from around 1600 until the middle of the 18th 
century? Indeed, in an age characterized early by virtuosi and 
polymaths, can one locate anything that resembles the 19th century 
notion of a scientific discipline? Ruestow argues that in 16th 
and 17th century Leiden, “It was within the traditional disci- 
pline of ‘physics,’ or ‘natural philosophy, t that the most direct 
confrontation took place between the new science and the inherited 
system of knowledge, and until new fields of study were recognized 
by the universities, it was within the framework of this discipline 
--and, to a lesser degree, within that of medicine as well--that 
the new science had to find its way into the lecture halls.” 
(pp. lo-111 To support this contention, Ruestow cites volume I 
of the Institutiones physicae (1645), written by Albert Kyper 
who held the chair of natural philosophy at Leiden. "The reshaping 
of physics at Leiden," says Ruestow, "had been obstructed not only 
by the tenacity of traditional philosophic views, but by the needs 
and traditional practices of pedagogy as well, and by an inherited 
tendency to view knowledge as, first and foremost, something to 
be taught. Physics existed in three states, Kyper had written: 
the first was a state of 'infusion,' such as when God granted 
knowledge to Adam and Solomon without effort on their part, and 
the second, a state of 'invention' wherein unknown theorems were 
brought to light, false theorems detected, obscure ones clarified, 
and disordered ones methodically arranged. The third was the 
state of 'discipline,' in which physical knowledge was taught 
by a teacher or learned from books. It was this last state that 
long dominated the conception of science and knowledge at seven- 
teenth-century Leiden." (p. 146) It is not clear from this cita- 
tion that Kyper’s “discipline” is not simply a synonym for “ins- 
truction and exercise .‘I Ruestow interprets Kyper to mean “disci- 
pline” in the sense of “branch of learning.” Thus, he argues that 
the discipline of physics, or natural philosophy,was defined as 
a locus of pedagogically diffused practice. 
This insight is interesting, but we still need to know in 
what, more precisely, consisted physics throughout this period. 
During the domination of the Aristotelians (the Scot Gilbertus 
Jacchaeus, Franc0 Burgersdijck), physics excluded mathematics. 
Ruestow devotes only several lines to the philosophical and ex- 
perimental approach of the professor of mathematics Willebrood 
Snellius (discoverer of the sine law for optical refraction), 
although the “professor of theoretical medicine and botany,” 
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Henri de Roy [or Regius), through his teaching and his Fundamenta 
physices (1646), is considered important for introducing Cartesian- 
ism into the “discipline of physics.” (p. 36) Of a certain Jacobus 
Grolius, “professor of mathematics and an acquaintance of Descartes, 
who in 1646 sponsored a student’s dissertation which maintained 
“‘that the quest for certain knowledge was to begin with doubt, I” 
we learn nothing. (p. 44) For Burchardus de Volder, who was ap- 
parently professor of natural philosophy from around 1670 to 
1705 (Ruestow is unclear about the beginning of his tenure and the 
name of his chair), “as for so many of his contemporaries,” mathe- 
matics was “the science par excellence of pure reason and, hence, 
of total comprehensibility.” (p. 106) De Volder insisted that 
mathematics and experimental philosophy be used in physics, al- 
though his mathemati zation “was not, however, the mathemati zation 
of nature achieved by Galileo and Newton. It was rather the 
familiar program for establishing pure rationalism in natural 
philosophy.” (p. 107) Not surprisingly, a contemporary of de 
Voider’s reports that in reading the first edition of Newton’s 
Principia, de Volder found it “‘not, in fact, easy to penetrate 
to the principles of the author’s demonstration, I” although those 
which he did examine he found to be true. (p. 111) 
During the second quarter of the 18th century, Willem Jacob 
‘s Gravesande, professor of mathematics and astronomy, exercised 
considerable influence over the discipline of physics. Is Grave- 
sande felt that natural philosophy should make use of both mathe- 
matics and experiment: his major work, published in 1720, bears 
the title, “Mathematical Elements of Physics Confirmed by Experi- 
ments” (Physices elementa mathematics, experimentis confirmata, 
siv introductio ad philosophiam Newtonianam). For Is Gravesande, 
mathematics constituted the only true foundation for physics: 
“He depicted all mathematical reasoning as pertaining to the com- 
parison of quantities and, in natural philosophy, resting on the 
laws of motion--indeed, it was precisely because motion was a 
quantity, he argued, that the whole of physics was to be treated 
mathematically.” (p. 132) Is Gravesande’s successor in the 
“discipline,” Petrus van Musschenbroek, one of the firmest sup- 
porters of experimental philosophy, taught mathematics, philosophy, 
and astronomy at Utrecht, and mathematics and philosophy at Leiden. 
It would appear, then, that the discipline of physics, in 
Ruestow’s sense, transcends institutionalized titles of identifica- 
tion. Ruestow’s physics, or natural philosophy, infused by 1750 
with the classical science of astronomy, various classical and 
modern mathematics, and with the new experimental philosophy 
(different, apparently, from “chemistry”--Ruestow does not cite 
recent work in 18th century chemistry by, for example, Thackray 
[1970] and Hufbauer [1971]), has become a gargantuan enterprise 
sporting both experimental and “theoretical” (p. 114) components. 
At this point, however, Ruestow’s disciplinary fabric groans 
under the strain of a certain anachronism. The disciplines of 
HM 3 Reviews 99 
experimental and theoretical physics, as well as the discipline 
of physics itself, were largely products of middle to late 19th 
century Germany. Indeed, it might be argued that the very notion 
of a scientific discipline emerges only with the 19th century. 
Though Ruestow defines what he means by the discipline of physics, 
1 find the nomenclature somewhat forced and misleading. 
The city of Leiden, free from war since the university’s 
founding, lies at the base of the university’s success and equal- 
ly at the base of its decline. By the middle of the 17th century, 
Leiden hosted an industrial concentration second only to Lyon, 
one centered in part around printing, a central vehicle for the 
continuing battle of ideas that was sheltered by the Dutch 
oligarchy. Ruestow’s contention is stated simply: “In such a 
milieu, how difficult it would have been for the University of 
Leiden--‘trophy,’ one of her professors called her, ‘of the 
restored liberty in the entire commonwealth’--to remain shuttered 
against the radical new developments in European thought, the 
most consequential, and the most disturbing, being the birth of 
modern science.” (p. 10) From shortly after the founding of the 
nominally Calvinist university, “the States of Holland and 
Westfriesland invited everyone, ‘of whatever state, condition, 
religion or quality he may be,’ to come study at Leiden in free- 
dom and security.” (p. 4) The university administration reflected 
this new liberty. The faculty were appointed by a board of cura- 
tors, composed of seven members and a secretary. Four were burge- 
meesters of the city of Leiden, and were accordingly chosen anew 
every year. The other three were appointed for life by the States 
of Holland and Westfriesland; one of these was a nobleman, and the 
other two usually came from the officials of the other major 
cities of Holland. Although the full professors constituted a 
senate, and yearly chose one of their number to be rector, the 
curators retained the real governing power. They appointed the 
faculty, determined salaries, and exercised a strong voice in 
prescribing course syllabi. 
Leiden, then, was a product of Dutch tolerance, economic 
prosperity, and an attendant cosmopolitanism. The philosophical 
faculty , although inferior in institutional importance to the 
faculties of theology, law, and medicine, and often lacking in 
first-rate intellects, nonetheless “distinguished their university 
by their sympathetic and continuing interest in the radical 
philosophic innovations of their time. Short on tradition and 
governed by the representatives of a broad-minded urban oligarchy, 
the University of Leiden, with but few and momentary exceptions, 
had shielded and encouraged the efforts of these professors to 
find their way through the contending claims of the old philosophy 
and the new science.” (pp. 153-153) As Dutch fortunes waned by 
the end of the 18th century, so did those of Leiden. The new 
universities at Halle and GGttingen, and the flowering of the 
University of Edinburgh, harbored the rise of other philosophical 
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faculties and resulted in a decline of students at Leiden. 
Finally, Leiden simply could not compete in resources with the 
scientific societies in London and Paris, nor with the vast pro- 
liferation of alternative institutional settings given over to 
natural philosophy in its many guises. By the beginning of the 
20th century, when physics (in the contemporary sense of the 
word) had clearly emerged as a scientific discipline (again the 
contemporary notion), the University of Leiden would once more 
become a focus of world attention. 
In the short space he allowed himself, Ruestow has presented 
us with a minor masterpiece. If the reader is careful to keep 
in mind what Ruestow means by “physics,” “discipline,” “experi- 
mental ,‘I and “mathematical ,” this study isa valuable contribution to the 
history of modern science. His method is worth close attentionbyall 
who would examine the social history of science. There is not, 
as one finds in so many other, inferior attempts, a “social 
context” chapter at the beginning and then, later, separate sec- 
tions on textual analysis. Arguments from texts and from a grow- 
ing secondary literature in social history are closely, indeed 
inextricably, interwoven with a deft hand. Ruestow’s style, 
itself, is exquisitely wrought. He has given us a rare book 
that is sophisticated, innovative, and a pleasure to read. 
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This is an extremely interesting, instructive and readable 
collection of essays written by one of the foremost workers in 
logic, foundations and philosophy of mathematics. It deserves 
a lengthy review article and a few M.A. dissertations rather 
than the present brief and inadequate review. First because 
books of this caliber, in the field of the philosophy of formal 
science, appear only once in a blue moon. Second because its 
author takes a strong polemical stand on certain issues, an 
extemely evasive or ambiguous one on others, and a rather naive 
